( By Carrington Dillon ) [Approx. Read Time: 1.5 Minutes]
The Tennessee Valley Authority has decided to continue its plans to spend $2.5 Billion and continue employing almost 1,900 workers in order to finish construction of a second reactor at their Watts Bar nuclear plant. The plant will be one of the first nuclear reactors constructed in the United States in decades.
This article gives light to some of the anti-nuclear groups protesting the decision to proceed with plans to finish constructing the reactor.
“Edwin Lyman, senior staff scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said the risk to too great to license Watts Bar, in part, because of the vulnerability of its ice containment design. Although used in nine other reactors including two at Sequoyah and the other Watts Bar reactor by TVA in Tennessee, Mr. Lyman said the risk from a hydrogen explosion within the reactor containment building is much greater than at other plants.
“There could be thousands of deaths from a major accident at Watts Bar II,” he said. Mr. Lyman is expected to soon testify before an NRC judicial panel, known as the Atomic Safety and Licensing Panel, which will try to decide if the Watts Bar reactor should be licensed.”
It’s interesting that Mr. Lyman is concerned about a hydrogen explosion at Watts Bar. Currently, I am working on one of TVA’s ice containment reactors and personally completed engineering work on ensuring that there were no risks of a hyrdogen explosion as a result of engineering work being completed there. I also did work on the containment structure and took a look at some of its staunch design aspects that prevent hypothetical explosions from even reaching the outside environment. So, I can personally assure Mr. Lyman that he has nothing to worry about. My career is dependent upon it.
Dear Mr. Dillon,
Thank you for your message. I continue to be concerned about the risk of hydrogen explosion at ice condenser plants because the NRC failed to implement mandatory requirements for mitigating hydrogen explosions during a station blackout, although it determined in 2003 that such requirements were warranted. The measures you refer to are voluntary and the NRC has no authority to enforce their effective implementation. I’m sure you are aware of the problems experienced at Sequoyah (and identified by an NRC inspector, not TVA) regarding faulty procedures that if followed, would have led to failure to energize the hydrogen igniters in the event of a blackout, as documented by NRC’s May 1, 2009 inspection report. Without formal, enforceable requirements, the public simply cannot have a sufficient level of assurance that these voluntary, non-safety-related, non-seismically qualified measures are adequate.
Sincerely,
Dr. Edwin Lyman
Senior Staff Scientist
Union of Concerned Scientists
According to the CDC, 36,000 Americans die every year from the flu. Car crashes kill another 40,000 Americans every year. There has NEVER BEEN ANY INJURY to a member of the American general public resulting from the operation of a domestic nuclear power plant. This record is made more impressive by the fact that nuclear power plants have been in operation within the US since 1957. Dr. Lyman, you can rest assured that professionals within the industry and at the NRC will continue to work diligently to ensure public safety at domestic nuclear power plants.
Voluntary safety measures like those recommended by INPO are enforced in the industry because they have consequences for the company as whole. Due to the NRC moving to risk-informed regulation and deciding not to overregulate, the NRC can make sound engineering/scientific judgments while industry can continue it’s safe operation record in a timely manner without excessive red tape so often encountered in bureaucracies.
Mr. Moses brings up an important point: “There has NEVER BEEN ANY INJURY to a member of the American general public resulting from the operation of a domestic nuclear power plant.” Some “scientists” might want to take a look at coal’s track record with respect to public safety.
In this industry we should be careful in our responses to outside criticism. It is futile to answer someone with a legitimate concern with a phrase such as “I can personally assure” or to use a red herring argument that simply points to nuclear’s track record. Honestly, this is probably not the forum for the technical discussion that needs to take place to answer Dr. Lyman’s question. I do not think it is fair to Dr. Lyman or the public to discount his concerns with subjective statements.
Rather, we should embrace Dr. Lyman’s specific concern and provide him with objective evidence that there is no risk. INPO’s Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture encourage scrutiny of our industry. Specifically principles #6 and #8 state (#6) A questioning attitude is cultivated and (#8) Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination. We should embrace technical scrutiny and answer questions thoroughly. If we cannot do this, then we need to get out of the nuclear business.
Although nuclear’s safety track record has been stellar, TMI and Davis Besse were to close for comfort; also, TMI set us back more than one decade from a construction standpoint.
TR